Hong Kong, August 26 (ANI): Tiananmen Square in the heart of Beijing will be on heightened alert come September 3, even more so than usual. The geographic and political heart of China will welcome throngs of VIPs and distinguished visitors, as well as the elite of the Chinese Communist Party, to witness a massive military parade.

The previous such parade was held in 2019, making this the first in six years. The parade is ostensibly to celebrate the 80th anniversary of the defeat of Japan in World War II, but it is far more than that. Indeed, this parade gives Chairman Xi Jinping and his mighty People's Liberation Army (PLA) the opportunity to strut in front of China and of the whole world, showing off its latest military kit.

PLA personnel have been training for months for this spectacular event, to ensure that every armoured vehicle and piece of equipment rolling along the broad expanse of Chang'an Avenue, and past the rostrum on the edge of the Forbidden City, does so in a perfectly precise manner. Overhead, the parade will culminate in a fly past of the PLA's latest aircraft.

Major General Xu Guizhong, executive deputy director of the Parade Command Office of the PLA's Central Theatre Command, said, 'The parade involves more than 10,000 personnel, over a hundred aircraft and several hundred ground vehicles.'

This is China's chance to shine, to impress the world with the power of its armed forces and to showcase its latest technology, or at least those parts it wishes to share. This parade is the ultimate propaganda event, an opportunity to impress friends and to instil fear and awe in would-be enemies.

Already, Beijing has played host to a couple of nighttime parade rehearsals. These practice runs are helpful to analysts, as they reveal what new equipment will participate in the 3 September parade. Although some items, such as drones or missiles, were draped in tarpaulins, the world now already knows of a number of new weapons to be officially unveiled at the anniversary parade.

Many new items are missiles, and the following descriptions outline some of them. Because no official announcement of each new item has been given yet, there is some degree of speculation as to their exact role.

The PLA Rocket Force (PLARF) is in charge of China's nuclear weapons, plus it controls conventional ballistic missiles as well. The PLARF contingent in any Chinese parade is always watched with great interest, and this year, there will be new DF-26D missiles in the PLARF phalanx.

The DF-26D is an unexpected version of the DF-26-family intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM) manufactured by the China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation (CASC). Known already are conventional and nuclear-armed

DF-26 versions that possess a range of 5,000+km, sufficient to reach Guam from mainland China. It is as yet unclear what specific enhancements the DF-26D has, or what its specific role is, but there is speculation it might be optimised for large maritime targets such as aircraft carriers or even port facilities. The dual role of the DF-26 is particularly problematic, since an enemy would not know whether a launched missile is carrying a conventional or nuclear warhead.

The PLARF is now also in possession of the CJ-1000 scramjet-powered land attack cruise missile. Likely to be hypersonic, the CJ-1000 is presumably an improvement on the CJ-100 exhibited at a previous parade.

The PLA Navy (PLAN) is showing a bevy of new YJ-family missiles, with this prefix typically denoting an anti-ship missile or land attack cruise missile. The YJ-21 is a hypersonic anti-ship ballistic missile, with hypersonic defined as speeds exceeding Mach 5.

This ship-launched, two-stage missile has a range of perhaps 1,500km. Related is the 2PZD-21 ballistic missile, which is launched from aircraft instead of by ship.

Both missile types should appear in the 3 September parade. There are other new naval missiles too. The YJ-15 seems to be powered by a ramjet, and it may succeed the supersonic YJ-12 anti-ship cruise missile (known as the CM-302 in its export version). This stealthy missile is estimated to be around 6.7m long. There are perhaps two new hypersonic anti-ship missiles as well.

Judging by the shape of its nose, the YJ-17 from the China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation (CASIC) has a glide vehicle capable of hypersonic speeds. It could be a 'waverider' missile that skips off the shockwaves produced during high-speed flight.

Similarly, the YJ-19 may be a hypersonic cruise missile. It has an air intake under its nose so could employ a scramjet. There is also a YJ-20 missile with a biconical shape.

There are suggestions it flies partially like a ballistic missile but still has the ability to maneuver. It may have been a YJ-20 that was fired from a Type 055 destroyer several years ago.

All these missiles indicate a significant upgrade in the PLAN's high-speed strike capabilities. They speed up China's kill chain, especially against mobile targets such as ships, and they are more difficult to defend against.

Air defence is also well represented with new weapons. Perhaps the most notable is the HQ-29, believed to be an anti-ballistic missile and anti-satellite weapon mounted on a 12x12 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL). That means it can target either incoming missiles at very high altitudes, or it can reach out to strike enemy satellites operating in low-Earth orbit. Indeed, Chinese media describe it as a 'double-barreled satellite hunter'.

The HQ-29 has been rumoured for some time, but this will be its first public appearance. Each TEL carries two HQ-29 missiles. Its appearance demonstrates how China is treating space as a vital warfare realm and is also moving beyond mere regional missile defence.

Another new air defence system in PLA service is the FK-3000, oriented towards anti-drone missions, especially drone swarms. The 6x6 truck-mounted FK-3000 features a presumed 30mm cannon as well as two pods of missiles. These could contain up to 96 FK-3000/S micro missiles. The FK-3000 was unveiled at Airshow China 2022 in Zhuhai, but the system is now in operational service. Its firing range is 300m to 12km.

This shows China has been learning well the lessons from combat in Ukraine, where drones are responsible for up to 80% of battlefield casualties. The FK-3000 combines kinetic cannon fire with missiles to provide layered protection against air threats.

The PLA will also parade a high-energy laser mounted on a truck, as well as a high- power microwave system. Such directed-energy weapons are another solution for defending against drones. Their advantage is that they do not need to be reloaded with ammunition or missiles, as long as they have an electrical supply.

New armoured vehicles are participating in the parade too. A sleek new tank is among the participants. It appears to have a 105mm main gun in what may turn out to be an unmanned turret, and protection includes extensive composite armour.

It also has a rooftop remote weapon station and quad-pack launchers for a hard-kill active protection system (APS). This appears to be a medium tank, perhaps designed to supplement or replace the ZTQ-15 light tank.

A new family of tracked combat vehicles for the PLAAF Airborne Corps was spotted late last year. Three variants, designed to replace the ageing ZBD-03 infantry fighting vehicle within the Airborne Corps, were spotted in parade rehearsals.

These include an infantry fighting vehicle (with a 30mm cannon in a turret), an armoured fire support vehicle (featuring a 120mm gun-mortar) and an armoured personnel carrier/general mission role vehicle (with a remote weapon station that most likely mounts a heavy machine gun, plus two anti-tank guided missiles).

Featuring much-improved protection compared to the ZBD-03, and even boasting China's GL6 APS, this new family gives Chinese paratroopers a capability boost. The vehicles can be landed by Y-20 transport aircraft, or even parachuted into drop zones.

Several new types of drones are expected to be unveiled, too. Perhaps as many as five new drone types may be shown, some of which may be collaborative combat aircraft (CCA) designed to accompany fighters. Only visible under protective coverings whilst being carried on the backs of trucks, one resembles the FH-97.

Two other drones are tailless designs with delta wings. Continuing with the unmanned theme, at least two unmanned ground vehicles are going to be present. Interestingly, these will be carried on the backs of trucks rather than moving autonomously. Does this reflect a lack of trust in the technology? There are also two brand new extra-large unmanned underwater vehicles in the parade.

They are nearly 20m long and are torpedo-shaped and move via pump-jet propulsion. Onetype is called the AJX002 and has a diameter of around 1.5m, while the other design has about twice the diameter. Doubtlessly, there will be many other surprises too, as all is unveiled on 3 September.

Incidentally, there is always debate over whether all these weapons are in service or are fictional. It should be noted, however, that China has a clear track record of only showing weapons that are operational to some degree. Rick Joe, a pseudonym used by a recognised expert on the PLA, offered this assessment: 'As per historical patterns, as well as official statements from the horse's mouth, systems shown are in some form of service with the PLA. In other words, parade systems at said time of a parade should already be in PLA hands, in service in some form, at a minimum.'

Joe clarified, 'This does not mean final operational capability; maybe initial operational capability or even initial operational test and evaluation.' Joe acknowledged that there have been rare exceptions where paraded equipment has not gone on to widespread service. One is the ZTZ98 main battle tank in the 1999 parade, which, although in service at the time, did not achieve widespread PLA adoption.

This is because the ZTZ999 was improved and instead enjoyed service as the ZTZ99. Another example that Joe highlighted is the GJ-11 unmanned combat aerial vehicle (UCAV) that appeared in the 2019 parade. It did enter service, but only in small numbers. It seems China continues to tinker with it, and it should appear again in the 2025 parade. Joe assessed: 'My hypothesis is the GJ-11 was/is a relatively high-end UCAV system, leading the PLA to develop new concepts of operations and establish infrastructure plus support to utilise them as part of initial operational test and evaluation, and became a pathfinder for overall UCAV/CCA work. But [the PLA is] still intent on fielding them (or an iterated version).'

Joe offered this conclusion: 'So, my advice: systems shown at this parade are not flaunting aspirational unready concepts. Rather, they represent real systems, and at a minimum are at early stages of PLA service.'

'If anything, one takeaway from this parade should be what they're not showing, because there are systems in final development or introduced to PLA service which won't appear.' He gave the example of the PL-16 air-to-air missiles and the DF-27 intermediate-range ballistic missile.

'All of which is to say,' Joe said, 'this parade can be seen as the PLA continuing to be a bit more transparent and open than the past. But it also indicates how much they still don't show us as well. It also shows how comprehensive PLA operational security is - entire categories of systems can be developed over years with minimal awareness in the public space, especially for missiles, drones and armoured fighting vehicles. But we've been surprised before, so this shouldn't be a huge eyebrow raiser.' (ANI)